Saturday, May 23, 2009
Secretary Chu
Secretary Chu announced $2.4 billion in carbon capture research. Great, it'll keep the national labs going. When do we get down to actually doing something about energy? Apparently, when we get a new Energy Secretary. (The secretary appears to be unaware of Congressional direction under the 2010 plan of the amended EP Act of 2005, or chooses to ignore it.) The only way to make a dent in current carbon emissions is with current technology. That means nuclear.
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Chairman Jaczko
Now that Obama’s confirmed Chairman Jaczko, we know that the NRC has a new titular head. Whether Chairman Jaczko leads, follows or continues to maintain that collegial body identified by the Kemeny Report will say more about future U.S. nuclear prospects than any press report. The U.S. nuclear industry is tired and stale, struggling to license passive safe designs. Meanwhile Japan, China, Korea, France, and even Taiwan race ahead, as we are left further behind. Mr. Jaczko could change that state of affairs, or merely sustain where we're at. In any event, stepping forward smartly to lead would take a new NRC hat. Is the U.S. NRC ready for the leadership that would put it on a new track? Standby folks, we’ll see, but don't hang onto your hat -- yet.
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Nuclear Industry Leadership at the Crossroads
Nuclear Industry Leadership at the Crossroads
Thirty Years Avoiding Kemeny Report Three Mile Island Questions
After the Three Mile Island (TMI) at Unit 2 accident on March 28, 1979, President Carter launched an investigation. He chartered a commission to examine the accident’s causes and recommend changes. The Kemeny Commission delivered its report to the President October 30, 1979. Citing nuclear safety concerns with its recommendations, it created anger. The Kemeny Commission called for fundamental changes in the nuclear industry’s organization, procedures, and practices, and the even Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC):
“To prevent nuclear accidents… fundamental changes will be necessary.”
The Kemeny report questioned nuclear structure and staff accountability. It cited the need for technical qualifications, designing, building and operating nuclear power plants. While calling for changes, it said basic requirements must be unequivocal. It asked the nuclear industry to address the complexity, accountability and overconfidence in its approach to nuclear design and operations, and equipment obsolescence. It said that changes would threaten nuclear culture - forewarning their report would challenge the industry.
President Carter approved recommendations when he accepted the report. Some never acknowledged the critical content in the Kemeny report, so key recommendations remain. Others struggled with the findings, avoiding their call for change. Circumstances refocused guidance in the report; Ronald Reagan’s election in 1981 tabled recommendations. In 1982, two Kemeny associates accused the NRC of dragging its feet - ignoring critical elements that remained. Addressing the report was as threatening as the TMI accident. Burying it was easier than changing nuclear processes or culture. Thus, nuclear issues remain today. Since that time, the complexity cited in the report contributing to the accident has grown ever worse.
Problems remain in nuclear industry institutions and its framework. Complexity remains common. Regulations abound in non-actionable guidance. Nuclear costs remain high. Waiting for regulatory guidance and approval, the industry lacks technical innovations common in other industries, like digital controls and information automation. In the meantime, nuclear technology slipped into obsolescence. Obsolete controls developed decades ago remain in nuclear service. Industry awaits NRC direction to make changes, rather than initiate them on its own. Lack of initiative still demonstrates Kemeny Commission complacency documented in the report in 1979 - thirty years ago!
For forty years - virtually its entire existence - regulatory direction came from outside the industry. Most commissioners lack nuclear operating experience. Today government lab experience dominates commissioner backgrounds. Commissioners lack critical insights from within the industry. Lacking commercial operations perspective, their oversight is limited. Leadership lacks profound knowledge based on nuclear experience, insights by America’s foremost quality management expert, W. Edwards Deming, deemed critical.
New nuclear designs should not repeat the errors of the past - the same errors that caused TMI. Congress should help industry redefine unanswered questions. Then the nuclear industry, its trade organizations like the Nuclear Energy Institute or the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations - even the NRC - could finally resolve open nuclear problems. An ineffective framework won’t support new commercial nuclear plant designs effectively, much less new designs like the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) - the new prototype plant Congress authorized. Intended to jump-start the hydrogen economy and help phase out carbon-based fuels, the NGNP will not be a success making the same evolutionary startup errors. We can’t afford the same cultural approach, chancing success by encouraging the same structural mindsets that gave us TMI.
The U.S. cannot prosper without nuclear power, so we must use all our experience to improve it. Rediscovering the Kemeny findings will not only continue to lower nuclear risks, but also benefit costs. Today - thirty years later - we should reevaluate the Kemeny Commission’s recommendations. We should finally address the structural nuclear issues that led Kemeny member Bruce Babbitt, Governor of Arizona, to conclude:
"There are still unresolved questions about what happened at Three Mile Island; … the institutional problems of the industry [must still be addressed]."
Congress should ask whether nuclear energy regulation can be more effective. “Is the framework today adequately safe and efficient?” “Can the NRC foster safer new nuclear technologies?” “Do regulatory bodies have a role restoring US nuclear energy leadership?” Or even, “Where does nuclear power technology need to be in the US today?” Congress should help resolve outstanding nuclear concerns. To fight complacency and allow safer, more effective nuclear energy growth, Congress must ask the nuclear industry’s leaders and regulators to address the issues. The industry must finally answer the Kemeny Commission. Only then can the highest-level safety, regulatory and cost-effectiveness concerns finally be laid to rest - along with the rest of TMI.
Thirty Years Avoiding Kemeny Report Three Mile Island Questions
After the Three Mile Island (TMI) at Unit 2 accident on March 28, 1979, President Carter launched an investigation. He chartered a commission to examine the accident’s causes and recommend changes. The Kemeny Commission delivered its report to the President October 30, 1979. Citing nuclear safety concerns with its recommendations, it created anger. The Kemeny Commission called for fundamental changes in the nuclear industry’s organization, procedures, and practices, and the even Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC):
“To prevent nuclear accidents… fundamental changes will be necessary.”
The Kemeny report questioned nuclear structure and staff accountability. It cited the need for technical qualifications, designing, building and operating nuclear power plants. While calling for changes, it said basic requirements must be unequivocal. It asked the nuclear industry to address the complexity, accountability and overconfidence in its approach to nuclear design and operations, and equipment obsolescence. It said that changes would threaten nuclear culture - forewarning their report would challenge the industry.
President Carter approved recommendations when he accepted the report. Some never acknowledged the critical content in the Kemeny report, so key recommendations remain. Others struggled with the findings, avoiding their call for change. Circumstances refocused guidance in the report; Ronald Reagan’s election in 1981 tabled recommendations. In 1982, two Kemeny associates accused the NRC of dragging its feet - ignoring critical elements that remained. Addressing the report was as threatening as the TMI accident. Burying it was easier than changing nuclear processes or culture. Thus, nuclear issues remain today. Since that time, the complexity cited in the report contributing to the accident has grown ever worse.
Problems remain in nuclear industry institutions and its framework. Complexity remains common. Regulations abound in non-actionable guidance. Nuclear costs remain high. Waiting for regulatory guidance and approval, the industry lacks technical innovations common in other industries, like digital controls and information automation. In the meantime, nuclear technology slipped into obsolescence. Obsolete controls developed decades ago remain in nuclear service. Industry awaits NRC direction to make changes, rather than initiate them on its own. Lack of initiative still demonstrates Kemeny Commission complacency documented in the report in 1979 - thirty years ago!
For forty years - virtually its entire existence - regulatory direction came from outside the industry. Most commissioners lack nuclear operating experience. Today government lab experience dominates commissioner backgrounds. Commissioners lack critical insights from within the industry. Lacking commercial operations perspective, their oversight is limited. Leadership lacks profound knowledge based on nuclear experience, insights by America’s foremost quality management expert, W. Edwards Deming, deemed critical.
New nuclear designs should not repeat the errors of the past - the same errors that caused TMI. Congress should help industry redefine unanswered questions. Then the nuclear industry, its trade organizations like the Nuclear Energy Institute or the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations - even the NRC - could finally resolve open nuclear problems. An ineffective framework won’t support new commercial nuclear plant designs effectively, much less new designs like the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) - the new prototype plant Congress authorized. Intended to jump-start the hydrogen economy and help phase out carbon-based fuels, the NGNP will not be a success making the same evolutionary startup errors. We can’t afford the same cultural approach, chancing success by encouraging the same structural mindsets that gave us TMI.
The U.S. cannot prosper without nuclear power, so we must use all our experience to improve it. Rediscovering the Kemeny findings will not only continue to lower nuclear risks, but also benefit costs. Today - thirty years later - we should reevaluate the Kemeny Commission’s recommendations. We should finally address the structural nuclear issues that led Kemeny member Bruce Babbitt, Governor of Arizona, to conclude:
"There are still unresolved questions about what happened at Three Mile Island; … the institutional problems of the industry [must still be addressed]."
Congress should ask whether nuclear energy regulation can be more effective. “Is the framework today adequately safe and efficient?” “Can the NRC foster safer new nuclear technologies?” “Do regulatory bodies have a role restoring US nuclear energy leadership?” Or even, “Where does nuclear power technology need to be in the US today?” Congress should help resolve outstanding nuclear concerns. To fight complacency and allow safer, more effective nuclear energy growth, Congress must ask the nuclear industry’s leaders and regulators to address the issues. The industry must finally answer the Kemeny Commission. Only then can the highest-level safety, regulatory and cost-effectiveness concerns finally be laid to rest - along with the rest of TMI.
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